Punitive damages in intellectual property law : a private international law perspective by Vanleenhove, Cedric
l a r c i e r
 203
Punitive damages in intellectual property law 
– a private international law outlook
Cedric Vanleenhove
Chapter I. Introduction
Article 13 of the Enforcement Directive 2004/48, headed “Damages”, provides 
in paragraph 1: “Member States shall ensure that the competent judicial author-
ities, on application of the injured party, order the infringer who knowingly, 
or with reasonable grounds to know, engaged in an infringing activity, to pay 
the right holder damages appropriate to the actual prejudice suffered by him/
her as a result of the infringement.
When the judicial authorities set the damages:
a. they shall take into account all appropriate aspects, such as the negative 
economic consequences, including lost profits, which the injured party has 
suffered, any unfair profits made by the infringer and, in appropriate cases, 
elements other than economic factors, such as the moral prejudice caused 
to the right holder by the infringement;
or
b. as an alternative to (a), they may, in appropriate cases, set the damages 
as a lump sum on the basis of elements such as at least the amount of 
royalties or fees which would have been due if the infringer had requested 
authorisation to use the intellectual property right in question.”
In OTK v. SFP the European Court of Justice (ECJ) had to rule on the question 
whether Polish law allowing the right holder to recover from the infringer of 
his copyright twice or three times the license fee that would have been due is 
compatible with Article 13 of the Enforcement Directive.1 Put differently, the 
Court in Luxemburg was asked if a national law providing for punitive damages 
for copyright infringement is in accordance with Article 13 of the Enforcement 
Directive. This contribution first looks at the judgment (II) and its effect on 
the implementation of the Directive in Belgium (III). As the European Court 
of Justice decided that Article 13 does not preclude such national legislation, 
it subsequently examines whether a judgment awarding such punitive damages 
will be enforced in other EU Member States (IV). Lastly, this contribution 
investigates the situation in which the enforcement of a judgment for punitive 
1 ECJ 25 January 2017, C-367/15, Stowarzyszenie “Oławska Telewizja Kablowa” v. Stowarzyszenie Filmow-
ców Polskich (hereinafter “ECJ OTK v. SFP case C-367/15”).
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damages for intellectual property infringement originating from outside the 
EU is sought in the EU (V).
Chapter II. The OTK v. SFP case
Section 1. Facts
The dispute arose between Stowarzyszenie “Oławska Telewizja Kablowa”, estab-
lished in Oława (Poland) (“OTK”), and Stowarzyszenie Filmowców Polskich 
(the Polish Filmmakers’ Association), established in Warsaw (Poland) (“SFP”). 
SFP is an organisation collectively managing copyright which is licensed in 
Poland and entitled to manage and protect copyright in audiovisual works. 
OTK is the Cable Television Association that broadcasts television programmes 
by means of a cable network in the Polish town of Oława.
After notice of termination was given on 30  December 1998 of a licensing 
agreement that set out the rules on payment between the parties to the main 
proceedings, OTK continued to make use of copyright works and filed an 
application with the Polish Copyright Commission seeking, in essence, that the 
fee payable for use of the copyright managed by SFP be set. The Copyright 
Commission set the fee at 1.6 % of the net income, exclusive of value added 
tax, earned by OTK from its retransmission of works by cable, not including 
certain charges borne by it. OTK itself calculated the amount due on that basis 
and paid SFP the sum of PLN 34,312.69 (roughly EUR 7,736.11) in respect 
of the income received for the period from 2006 to 2008.
In the meantime, SFP had already started court proceedings against OTK. It 
requested that OTK be prohibited from retransmitting the protected audio-
visual works until a new licensing agreement was agreed upon and that OTK 
be ordered to pay PLN 390,337.50 (roughly EUR  88,005.17) together with 
statutory interest. The dispute travelled through the Polish court system and 
reached the Polish Supreme Court on three separate occasions. When asked 
to examine the case for the third time, the Supreme Court had doubts as to 
whether a Polish law provision, Article  79(1)(3)(b) of the Law on copyright 
and related rights of 4  February 1994, was compatible with Article  13 of 
the Enforcement Directive. Under the Polish provision it is possible, at the 
request of the right holder, for compensation to consist in payment of a sum 
of money corresponding to twice or three times the amount of the appropriate 
fee, without having to prove the actual loss or a causal link. The license fee 
that would have been due is also called the hypothetical royalty. This option 
exists next to the possibility of claiming compensation for the damage actually 
suffered, taking into account all the appropriate aspects of the particular case.
The Polish provision was declared partially unconstitutional after the Supreme 
Court had referred its request for a preliminary ruling to the ECJ. The Consti-
tutional Court of Poland had ruled that the provision violates the Constitution 
in so far as it allows the right holder to claim, in the event of a culpable 
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infringement, payment of a sum corresponding to three times the amount of 
the appropriate fee. The ECJ, therefore, only had to decide on the constitutional 
part of the provision (namely the awarding of twice the fee as damages).
Section 2. Decision of the ECJ
The European Court of Justice first of all notes that Article 3(2) of the Enforce-
ment Directive requires that the measures, procedures and remedies necessary to 
ensure the enforcement of the intellectual property rights covered by the Direc-
tive are effective, proportionate and dissuasive.2 The calculation of damages 
is included therein.3
It further rules that the Enforcement Directive lays down a minimum standard 
concerning the enforcement of intellectual property rights and does not prevent 
the EU Member States from enacting more protective measures.4 International 
agreements such as TRIPS, the Berne Convention and the Rome Convention 
equally permit Contracting States to grant the holders of the rights concerned 
wider protection than that respectively laid down by these instruments.5
The Court, therefore, holds that Article  13(1)(b) of the Directive has to be 
interpreted as not precluding legislation which provides that the holder of eco-
nomic rights of copyright that have been infringed may require the infringer to 
compensate for the loss caused by payment of a sum corresponding to twice 
the amount of a hypothetical royalty.6
This interpretation cannot be called into question by the fact that compensation 
calculated on the basis of twice the hypothetical royalty is not precisely pro-
portional to the loss actually suffered by the injured party. That characteristic 
is inherent in any lump-sum compensation, such as the one in Article 13(1)(b) 
of the Directive.7
Furthermore, this interpretation does not come into conflict with recital 26 of 
the Enforcement Directive, which provides that the Directive does not have 
the aim of introducing an obligation to provide for punitive damages.8 The 
fact that the Directive does not entail an obligation on the Member States 
to provide for punitive damages cannot be interpreted as a prohibition on 
introducing such a measure.9
Besides, without there being any need to rule on whether or not the intro-
duction of punitive damages would be contrary to Article  13, the European 
Court of Justice finds in the case at hand that it is not evident that the Polish 
2 ECJ, C-367/15, OTK v. SFP, para. 21.
3 ECJ, C-367/15, OTK v. SFP, para. 22.
4 ECJ, C-367/15, OTK v. SFP, para. 23.
5 ECJ, C-367/15, OTK v. SFP, para. 24.
6 ECJ, C-367/15, OTK v. SFP, para. 25.
7 ECJ, C-367/15, OTK v. SFP, para. 26.
8 ECJ, C-367/15, OTK v. SFP, para. 27.
9 ECJ, C-367/15, OTK v. SFP, para. 28.
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provision entails an obligation to pay such damages.10 It points out that mere 
payment of the hypothetical royalty is not capable of guaranteeing compen-
sation in respect of all the loss actually suffered, given that payment of that 
royalty would not, in itself, ensure reimbursement of any costs –  referred to 
in recital 26 – that are linked to researching and identifying possible acts of 
infringement, compensation for possible moral prejudice or payment of interest 
on the sums due. OTK had apparently also admitted that payment of twice the 
amount of the hypothetical royalty is equivalent in practice to compensation 
of an amount remaining below what the holder would be able to claim on 
the basis of the damage actually suffered.11 The ECJ does recognise that it is 
possible, in exceptional cases, that payment of twice the hypothetical royalty 
exceeds the loss actually suffered so clearly and substantially that a claim 
to that effect could constitute an abuse of rights, which is forbidden under 
Article 3(2) of the Directive. However, on the facts of the case, it appears that 
a Polish court would not be bound in such a situation by the claim of the 
holder of the infringed right.12
Section 3. Evaluation
The judgment of the ECJ in OTK v. SFP gives the Member States freedom 
to maintain or adopt provisions which offer the right holder the possibility 
to claim damages calculated by multiplying the license fee that would have 
been due (the hypothetical royalty).13 In other words, it allows the awarding 
of punitive damages in infringement cases.14 One has to be careful when using 
the punitive damages label. As long as the damages awarded do not exceed 
the actual damage suffered, the damages should not be classified as punitive, 
even if they are arrived at by a multiplication of the hypothetical royalty. The 
ECJ alludes to this in its judgment.15 Only when the damages exceed the actual 
damage, a real punitive effect emerges.
As the Enforcement Directive does not forbid punitive damages, national leg-
islation can employ the multiplication of the hypothetical royalty to set the 
appropriate damages for the infringement of an intellectual property right. The 
ECJ does, however, establish an upper limit: when the hypothetical royalties 
exceed the loss actually suffered so clearly and substantially that a claim to 
that effect could constitute an abuse of rights (in the sense of Art.  3[2] of 
10 ECJ, C-367/15, OTK v. SFP, para. 29.
11 ECJ, C-367/15, OTK v. SFP, para. 30.
12 ECJ, C-367/15, OTK v. SFP, para. 31.
13 In contrast, adv. gen. Sharpston had argued that the Polish provision did not meet the requirements of Dir. 
2004/48. She had, however, added that a national rule under which the rightholder may claim a sum which 
is limited to two or three times the license fee is not unlawful, provided that the rightholder can establish 
that the sum claimed is proportionate to the damage suffered: Op. adv. gen. E. Sharpston, 24 November 
2016, C-367/15, Stowarzyszenie “Oławska Telewizja Kablowa” v. Stowarzyszenie Filmowców Polskich, 
paras 47-48.
14 Note, however, the following sentence in para. 29 which might justify a different reading of the judgment: 
“[...] without there being any need to rule on whether or not the introduction of punitive damages would 
be contrary to Article 13 [...]”.
15 ECJ, C-367/15, OTK v. SFP, para. 30.
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the Enforcement Directive).1617 If the damages awarded by the national court 
surpass the actual damage suffered by the right holder while at the same time 
do not constitute an abuse of rights, the judgment rendered by the national 
court contains “real” punitive damages.
In light of this ruling of the ECJ, it is thus conceivable that national courts 
will award punitive damages for intellectual property rights infringements. 
Punitive damages are highly controversial in the EU Member States. Punitive 
damages are officially only available in the Common Law countries within 
the EU (i.e. England & Wales, Ireland, Northern Ireland and Cyprus), albeit 
in a limited number of circumstances.18 In contrast to their acceptance within 
Common Law jurisdictions, they are said to be relatively non-existent in Civil 
Law countries. An important question that, therefore, arises in that regard is 
whether a judgment for punitive damages in intellectual property cases will 
be able to freely circulate in the European Union or whether Member States 
can reject the enforcement of such a judgment within their territory (IV). 
First, however, we discuss the ramifications of the judgment for the Belgian 
practice (III).
Chapter III. Belgian implementation of Article 13 and 
effect of ECJ decision
The Enforcement Directive was transposed into Belgian law by the Acts of 
9 and 10 May 2007.19 As to damages the Act of 9 May 2007 provides that 
the wronged party is entitled to compensation of all damage suffered due to 
the counterfeit or the infringement. The Act does not explicitly list the criterion 
of the hypothetical royalty which the Directive puts forward as the minimum 
but the court should be able to take it into consideration when setting the 
damages.20 In the preparatory process the question whether the damages can 
be of a punitive nature was not addressed. This lack of legislative debate led to 
controversy.21 The Explanatory Memorandum of the Act of 9 May 2007 does 
16 ECJ, C-367/15, OTK v. SFP, para. 31.
17 The estimation of the actual damage suffered is problematic because that is exactly what provisions 
allowing for the use of a hypothetical royalty want to avoid. Such provisions are inserted to offer an 
alternative for the difficult and costly task of calculating the actual loss: IPKat blogspot 24  February 
2017, The Enforcement Directive permits punitive damages – or does it?, ipkitten.blogspot.be/2017/02/
the-enforcement-directive-permits.html.
18 In England, for instance, punitive damages can only be awarded in three scenarios: abuses of power by 
government officials, torts committed for profit, or express statutory authorization: Rookes v. Barnard, 
[1964] 1 All E.R. 367, 410-11 (H.L.).
19 Wet van 9 mei betreffende de burgerrechtelijke aspecten van de bescherming van intellectuele eigendoms-
rechten, BS 10 mei 2007, err. 15 mei 2007, en wet van 10 mei betreffende de aspecten van gerechtelijk 
recht van de bescherming van intellectuele eigendomsrechten, BS 10 mei 2007, err. BS 14 mei 2007.
20 C.  Ronse, “De andere herstelmaatregelen en in het bijzonder de schadevergoeding”, in Sancties en pro-
cedures in intellectuele rechten – Sanctions et procédures en droits intellectuels (F. Brison ed.), Brussels, 
Larcier, 2008, p. 237.
21 J. Keustermans, P. Blomme and M. Flamme, Auteursrecht – Capita selecta, Brussels, Larcier, 2015, p. 181, 
no.  291; C.  Ronse, “De andere herstelmaatregelen en in het bijzonder de schadevergoeding”, op.  cit., 
p. 226-227.
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refer to Article 13.1 and recital 26 of the Enforcement Directive as excluding 
punitive damages.22
A fundamental rule runs through Belgian law: the principle of restitutio in 
integrum.23 The Belgian implementation of the Enforcement Directive follows 
this principle.24 The principle implies that the injured party is to be put in the 
position he or she would have been in had the damaging event not occurred.25 
It has also been upheld by the case law in intellectual property disputes.26 A 
right holder is thus entitled to full compensation of the damage suffered, but 
nothing more than that.27
In Belgium some courts have awarded “double damages”, inter alia in cases 
concerning software. Such decisions are motivated by a desire to deter infring-
ers.28 These courts asserted that awarding the (even augmented) royalty fee has 
a perverse effect in that it stimulates infringers to speculate on the right holder 
either not noticing the infringement or remaining passive after discovery.29
The Court of Appeal of Ghent, for instance, granted damages equal to twice 
the license fee to AutoDesk, holder of the copyright on AutoCad, a commercial 
computer-aided design and drafting software application.30 An employee of 
Decorline had installed and used an illegal copy of AutoCad on his work station 
as well as on his home system. The Decorline company used the AutoCad 
software program for its activities. The Court of Appeal found an infringement 
of copyright and confirmed the liability of employee and employer. As to the 
amount of damages, the Court of Appeal noted that it cannot be established 
with mathematical certainty and decided to determine it ex aequo et bono.31 
It further remarked that Article 13 of the Enforcement Directive and the Soft-
ware Act do not contain the principle of double damage (200  % damages). 
Nevertheless, the Court decided to grant AutoDesk 200 % of the licensee fee, 
because of the material and moral damage the latter had suffered.
In the same vein, the Court of Appeal of Antwerp awarded an amount of two 
times the hypothetical royalty.32 The case also dealt with the illegal use of the 
22 See the discussion of Art.  2 of the proposed bill in the Explanatory Memorandum, Parl.St. 2006-07, 
51/2943-1-2944/1, p. 28-29.
23 P. Maeyaert, “Art. 86” in F. Brison and H. Vanhees (eds.), Jan Corbet Huldeboek: De Belgische auteurs-
wet – Artikelsgewijze commentaar, Brussels, Larcier, 2012, p.  596-597; Cass., 13  April 1995, JT 1995, 
p. 649.
24 B. Weyts, “Economische schade”, TBH 2013, p. 1034, no. 52.
25 W. Van Gerven, J. Lever and P. Larouche, Tort Law, Oxford, Hart Publ., 2000, p. 770.
26 See, for instance, Ghent 22 April 1998, IRDI 1998, p. 232, with note B. De Vuyst; Rb. Brussels, 8 December 
2004, A&M 2005, p. 249.
27 J. Keustermans, P. Blomme and M. Flamme, Auteursrecht – Capita selecta, op. cit., p. 184, no. 294.
28 C. Ronse, “De andere herstelmaatregelen en in het bijzonder de schadevergoeding”, op. cit., p. 232.
29 Ibid., p. 232, footnote 28, with further ref. to M. Buydens, “La réparation du dommage en droit de la 
propriété industrielle”, TBH 1995, p. 450, no. 3; M. Buydens, Droit des brevets d’invention et protection 
du savoir-faire, Brussels, Larcier, 1999, p. 241-244, nos. 453-454; A. Puttemans, “Les droits intellectuels 
en action(s)” in P. Jadoul and A. Strowel (eds.), Les droits intellectuels: développements récents, Brussels, 
Larcier, 2004, p. 38-39, no. 40; S. Malengreau, “Atteinte aux droits d’auteur: dommage et interest”, IRDI 
2003, p. 201-203; A. Puttemans, “Les droits intellectuels en action(s)”, op. cit., p. 72-74, nos 96-97.
30 Ghent 19 January 2009, A&M 2009, p. 384 with note J. Keustermans and T. De Maere.
31 This is a common practice: P. Maeyaert, “Art. 86”, op. cit., p. 597.
32 Antwerp 13 October 2008, A&M 2009, p. 391, with note J. Keustermans.
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software program AutoCad. The Court of Appeal found that a mathematical 
calculation is not possible. It did underline that the copyright holder’s damage is 
greater than the mere loss of the sale of its product. It referred to the different 
components of the damage suffered by AutoDesk: loss of profit, moral damage, 
damage as a consequence of having to search for illegal software, disruption 
of the normal market economy by the infringer etc. Consequently, the Court 
deemed a doubling of the license fee to be appropriate (thereby reversing the 
first judge’s use of a 1.5 coefficient).
Reference can also be made to a decision of the Court of first instance of 
Leuven.33 The Court in that case clearly stated that the payment of the fee for 
reproduction rights without damages is insufficient. It would encourage people 
not to seek consent for the use of protected works and to speculate on the 
subsequent non-action of the right holder.
While these decisions at first sight appear to conflict with the principle of 
restitutio in integrum, an important nuance needs to be made. Even if courts 
sporadically employ language (such as terms like “double damage”) that seems 
to indicate an escape from the full compensation corset, it needs to be assessed 
whether the Court’s judgment is also a de facto departure from the principle 
of restitutio in integrum. In fact, as long as these “double damages” do not 
exceed the actual damage suffered, courts do not grant real punitive damag-
es.34 The judgment of the Court of Appeal of Ghent mentioned above forms 
a good illustration in that regard.35 The doubling of the payment that would 
have been due if consent was sought corresponds in casu to actual damage 
suffered.36 It is inspired by the Court’s efforts to provide as full a compensa-
tion as possible. This quest to make the right holder whole has deterrence as 
a side-effect. Despite having attached a “double damage” label to its ruling, 
the Court has thus awarded a “single damage”.37 The use of such unfortunate 
terminology, however, needs to be avoided as it suggest an arbitrary assessment 
of the damage suffered.38
Further evidence can be found in a judgment of the Belgian Supreme Court 
of 2009.39 The Court of Appeal of Liège had awarded damages consisting of 
two aspects: 1) the amount due had the infringer requested and obtained the 
right holder’s consent; and 2) 25  % of the previous amount because of the 
exceptional administrative costs and the right holder’s need to finance the costs 
for detecting and pursuing piracy and counterfeit. The underlying purpose of 
33 Rb. Leuven 2 May 2006, A&M 2006, p. 457.
34 Of course, nothing stops courts from granting real punitive damages but disguising them by considering 
that the inflated damages correspond to actual damage suffered: B. Weyts, “Economische schade”, op. cit., 
p. 1036, no. 57.
35 See Rb. Kortrijk 24 April 2004, A&M 2005, p. 57; for another ex.: C. Ronse, “De andere herstelmaatre-
gelen en in het bijzonder de schadevergoeding”, op. cit., p. 235, footnote 35.
36 For another view, F.  Petillion, “Schadevergoeding voor inbreuken op intellectuele rechten: ex aequo et 
malo”, Computerrecht 2009, p. 227 (case note under Ghent 19 January 2009).
37 J. Ceustermans and T. De Maere, “Foutbegrip en schadevergoeding in het auteursrecht: double damage?”, 
A&M 2009, p. 391 (case note under Ghent 19 January 2009).
38 See in that sense F.  Petillion, “Schadevergoeding voor inbreuken op intellectuele rechten: ex aequo et 
malo”, op. cit., p. 227 (case note under Ghent 19 January 2009).
39 Cass. 13 May 2009, AR P. 09.0121.F, www.cass.be, A&M 2009, p. 384.
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the 25 % increase was its deterrent effect. Deterrence cannot be achieved by 
merely exposing an infringer to the risk of having to pay the license fee after 
all. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment and held that neither the need 
to finance the universal combat against violations of intellectual property nor 
the deterrent character of a lump sum on top of the fee that was dodged can 
justify the awarding of this amount as the actual damage suffered by the right 
holder. The Supreme Court thus allows “multiple damages” if the actual damage 
is higher than the fee that would have been due. The expansion of damages 
may, however, not be motivated by a deterrent purpose or by the motive to 
compensate for costs attached to the general40 battle against counterfeit goods.41
There will undoubtedly be cases where damages do surpass the actual damage42 
and real punitive damages thus emerge. Such rulings are not problematic because 
the European Court of Justice allows damages in excess of real damage as 
long as there is no abuse of rights. The ECJ judgment in OTK v. SFP should, 
therefore, only have a limited impact on the manner in which the Belgian 
judiciary applies the transposition of the Enforcement Directive. The European 
Court of Justice has actually set the permissible upper boundary higher than 
the full compensation limit most courts adhere to anyways.
It is thus possible that a Belgian court does ignore the basic principle of full 
compensation (and according to the OTK v. SFP decision it is allowed to do 
so as long as it is wary of an abuse of rights). Likewise, courts in other (EU) 
countries might award damages in amounts going above the actual damage. 
This situation is discussed in parts IV and V.
Chapter IV. Enforcement of intra-EU punitive 
damages judgments
The enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial cases in the European 
Union is regulated by the Brussels Ibis Regulation.43 The Regulation replaced 
the Brussels I Regulation44 as of 10  January 2015  and facilitates the free 
circulation of judgments within the EU. The Brussels I Regulation required a 
declaration of enforceability (exequatur) for a judgment given in a Member 
State to be enforced in another Member State.45 The Brussels Ibis Regulation 
substantially simplifies the system put in place by the Brussels I Regulation as 
it abolishes the need for an exequatur.
40 Leaving the door open for compensation of detection and combat costs in a specific case: Brussels 13 April 
1995, Pas. 1995, II, p. 21; Corr. Brussels 21 February 2008, A&M 2008, p. 113.
41 P. Maeyaert, “Art. 86” in F. Brison and H. Vanhees (eds.), Jan Corbet Huldeboek: De Belgische auteurswet 
– Artikelsgewijze commentaar, Brussels, Larcier, 2012, op. cit., p. 598.
42 C.  Ronse, “De andere herstelmaatregelen en in het bijzonder de schadevergoeding”, op.  cit., p.  232; 
B. Weyts, “Economische schade”, op. cit., p. 1034, no. 53.
43 Regul. (EU) no. 1215/2012 of 12 December 2012 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of 
judgments in civil and commercial matters, OJEU, no. L351/1 of 20 December 2012.
44 Regul. (EC) no. 44/2001 of 22  December 2000 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of 
judgments in civil and commercial matters, OJEC, no. L12 of 15 January 2001.
45 Art. 38.1 Brussels I Regul.
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The Brussels Ibis Regulation, nevertheless, still provides for grounds to refuse 
enforcement of a judgment. Article  46 refers to the grounds for refusal of 
recognition of a judgment in Article 45. The first ground of refusal (Art. 46 
iuncto Art. 45, 1, a) is relevant in the context of punitive damages. Member 
States shall reject enforcement of the judgment if the enforcement is manifestly 
contrary to public policy (ordre public) in the Member State addressed.
The notion of public policy or ordre public refers to the common core of 
principles that are vital for the effective operation and social acceptance of a 
legal system. It reflects the fundamental socio-economic and moral values of a 
society.46 It has both a procedural and a substantive dimension.47 For punitive 
damages the latter is usually the most relevant of the two.48
Private international law cases, however, deal with a more restricted form 
of public policy, namely international public policy.49 The latter is, despite 
the name, a purely national concept.50 Only international public policy can 
act as a barrier to the enforcement of a foreign judgment. It contains those 
fundamental rules of domestic or internal public policy which a legal system 
wants respected in international cases as well.5152 In enforcement cases comity 
requires a legal system to be more tolerant than it would be in purely domestic 
affairs.53 Moreover, it is not the foreign decision that must be scrutinised but 
the concrete effect its application or enforcement generates in the forum.54
International public policy works in a negative way,55 in the sense that it acts as 
a gatekeeper to keep away foreign judgments that are absolutely unacceptable 
46 H. Auf’mkolk, “U.S. punitive damages awards before German courts – Time for a new approach”, Freiburg 
L. Stud. J., 2007, p. 4.
47 H. Gaudemet-Tallon, Compétence et exécution des jugements en Europe, Paris, LGDJ, 2010, no. 402 and 
ff.
48 J. Dollinger, “World Public Policy: Real International Public Policy in the Conflict of Laws”, 17 Tex. Int’l 
L.J.,l 1982, p. 170; M. Requejo Isidro, “Punitive Damages: How Do They Look Like When Seen From 
Abroad?” in L. Meurkens and E. Nordin (eds.), The Power of Punitive Damages – Is Europe Missing 
Out?, Cambridge/Antwerp/Portland, Intersentia, 2012, p. 323.
49 P. Mayer and V. Heuzé, Droit international privé, Paris, Montchrestien, 2004, p. 149, no. 205; A. Mills, 
The Confluence of Public and Private International Law – Justice, Pluralism and Subsidiarity in the Inter-
national Constitutional Ordering of Private Law, Cambridge, CUP, 2009, p.  275-277; A.  Mills, “The 
Dimensions of Public Policy in Private International Law”, J.Priv.Int’l L. 2008, p. 213; P. Bernard and 
H. Salem, “Further developments for qualification of foreign judgments for recognition and enforcement 
in France: the test for punitive damage awards”, Int’l Bar Ass. 2011, p. 18.
50 J.  Dollinger, “World Public Policy: Real International Public Policy in the Conflict of Laws”, op.  cit., 
p. 170.
51 A.S.  Sibon, “Enforcing Punitive Damages Awards in France: Facing Proportionality within International 
Public Policy”, no page numbers, available at ssrn.com/abstract=2382817.
52 Both concepts can be visualised as two concentric circles, with domestic public policy being the larger of 
the two. All principles belonging to international public policy also have domestic public policy status but 
not vice versa.
53 B.  Janke and F.-X.  Licari, “Enforcing Punitive Damage Awards in France after Fountaine Pajot”, 60 
Am.J.Comp.L. 2012, p. 792.
54 V.  Behr, “Punitive Damages in American and German Law – Tendencies Towards Approximation of 
Apparently Irreconcilable Concepts”, 78 Chi.-Kent L.Rev. 2003, p. 153; P. Klötgen, “L’appréhension des 
punitive damages par le droit allemande”, Rev.Lamy Dr.aff. 2013, p. 126; BGH, 26 September 1979, BGHZ 
1980, p. 171; B. Janke and F.-X. Licari, “Enforcing Punitive Damage Awards in France after Fountaine 
Pajot”, op. cit., p. 792.
55 A. Dickinson, The Rome II Regulation – The Law Applicable to Non-Contractual Obligations, Oxford/
New York, OUP, 2008, p. 631, no. 15.13; A.J. Belohlavek, “Public Policy and Public Interest in Interna-
tional Law and EU Law”, Czech Yearb. Int’l L. 2012, p. 144.
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when measured against domestic legal standards.56 For the activation of inter-
national public policy it is not sufficient that the solution offered by the foreign 
nation is different,57 it has to be shocking for the forum.58 International public 
policy thus protects the whole of fundamental societal values from phenomena 
that are at odds with it, through negation.59
It seems unlikely that a punitive award originating in one Member State will 
be denied enforcement in another Member State. As far as we are aware 
no reported case law has dealt with this situation.60 Member States’ courts 
should not decline the enforcement of punitive damages granted by a court of 
another Member State. The restrictive wording of the public policy exception 
in Article 45, 1, a) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation (a manifest contrariety with 
public policy is required to justify refusal) and the principle of mutual trust 
between Member States support this contention.61
Chapter V. Enforcement of third State punitive 
damages judgments in the EU
This contribution has thus far approached punitive damages exclusively from 
an EU perspective. It is, however, equally interesting to discuss whether third 
State judgments containing punitive damages for intellectual property violations 
will be able to penetrate the borders of “Fortress Europe” and be granted 
enforcement here.
56 H. Auf’mkolk, “U.S. punitive damages awards before German courts – Time for a new approach”, op. cit., 
p. 5.
57 A. Dickinson, The Rome II Regulation – The Law Applicable to Non-Contractual Obligations, op. cit., 
p. 626, no. 15.04.
58 G.  Cuniberti, “The Liberization of the French Law of Foreign Judgments”, 56 Int’l Comp.L.Q. 2007, 
p. 933.
59 A.J. Belohlavek, “Public Policy and Public Interest in International Law and EU Law”, op. cit., p. 142.
60 In a case before the Oberlandesgericht Düsseldorf, the public policy obstacle did come into play for – 
what we believe to be – punitive damages. The Oberlandesgericht was confronted with a Dutch judgment 
awarding an employee 50 % on top of his unpaid wages. Art. 7:625 of the Dutch Civ. C. imposes a pecu-
niary sanction on the employer who does not pay the salary of his employee within 3 days after it is due. 
The worker is entitled to an additional payment of 5 % per day of delay after this 3 day period. From 
the sixth day after the 3 day period has elapsed the increase is 1 % per day. The total increase can never 
exceed 50 % of the wages. The applicant requested enforcement of the default judgment in Germany. The 
Court did not find a violation of the public policy exception of the Brussels I Regul. (which is identical to 
the public policy exception under the Brussels Ibis Regul.). The sanction was not deemed sufficiently com-
parable to punitive damages. The penal monopoly of the state is not affected by the increase for delay in 
payment. Although the 50 % increase is a high number, it does not reach the threshold for unenforceability. 
For a discussion of the judgment of 4 April 2011, see M. Würdinger, “Der ordre public-Vorbehalt bei 
Verzugsaufschlägen im niederländischen Arbeitsrecht”, IPRax 2013, p. 323-324. We (partly) disagree with 
the qualification by the German Court. If the interest exceeds the average interest demanded by banks for 
loans, it goes beyond compensation and steps into the realm of punishment. Therefore, to the extent that 
the damages awarded in this dispute do amount to punitive damages, the case can serve as an example of 
the acceptance of intra-EU judgments for punitive damages.
61 M. Requejo Isidro, “Punitive Damages: How Do They Look Like When Seen From Abroad?”, op. cit., 
p. 326-327.
Punitive damages in intellectual property law – a private international law outlook 213
l a r c i e r
Section 1. Occurrence
Outside the EU, Common Law countries such as Australia, New Zealand, 
Canada and South Africa provide for this type of damages. The most impor-
tant source of punitive damages judgments is, however, the United States. The 
United States produces the most punitive damages judgments and its awards62 
reach the highest amounts.63
The remedy of punitive damages is, alongside, for instance, contingency fees, 
discovery and class actions, one of the characteristics of the American legal 
system which exemplifies the contrast between Civil Law and Common Law. 
The stark divergence in approach, referred to as “the Atlantic divide”64, between 
dualistic65 Common Law and monistic66 Civil Law jurisdictions makes punitive 
damages an interesting study subject from a private international law perspec-
tive. The field of private international law is where the Civil Law’s level of 
tolerance for this “[undesired] peculiarity of American law”67 is tested.
In the U.S. punitive damages most often arise under State tort law.68 Each State 
of the U.S. has a wide discretion in imposing punitive damages. The federal 
system of the U.S. has created considerable diversity among the 50 States as 
to the form and content of punitive damages.69 In addition to the various State 
laws, the federal level also provides for punitive damages in certain statutes. 
The availability of punitive damages is in principle restricted to tort actions.70 
The fact that the defendant has acted in an unlawful manner does not suffice 
for punitive damages to be awarded. The conduct in question must involve a 
degree of aggravation.71 The Restatement of Torts emphasises that “punitive 
damages may be awarded for conduct that is outrageous, because of the defend-
ant’s evil motive or his reckless indifference to the rights of others”.72 Across 
the different American States a varying terminology is employed to express 
the required high standard of misconduct: “egregious”, “reprehensible”, “bad 
faith”, “fraud”, “malice”, “oppression”, “outrageous”, “violent”, “wanton”, 
62 The term “award” here does not refer to arbitral awards but rather to a portion of a court judgment.
63 C.I.  Nagy, “Recognition and enforcement of US judgments involving punitive damages in continental 
Europe”, Nederlands Internationaal Privaatrecht 2012, p. 4.
64 E. de Kezel, “The Protection and Enforcement of Private Interests by (the Recognition of US) Punitive 
Damages in Belgium” in The Power of Punitive Damages – Is Europe Missing Out?, op. cit., p. 214.
65 This notion characterises legal systems which provide for compensatory damages as well as punitive 
damages.
66 This term refers to legal systems where only compensatory damages are available.
67 E. de Kezel, “The Protection and Enforcement of Private Interests by (the Recognition of US) Punitive 
Damages in Belgium”, op. cit., p. 235.
68 A.J.  Sebok, “The U.S.  Supreme Court’s Theory of Common Law Punitive Damages” in The Power of 
Punitive Damages – Is Europe Missing Out?, op. cit., p. 133.
69 W.  Schubert, “Simplifying Punitive Damages: Due Process and the Pursuit of Manageable Awards and 
Procedures in U.S. Courts”, Eur.J.Consumer L. 2011, p. 832; A.J. Sebok, “Punitive Damages in the United 
States”, in Punitive Damages: Common Law and Civil Law Perspectives (H. Koziol and V. Wilcox eds), 
Vienna, Springer, 2009, p. 156.
70 22 Am. Jur. 2d Damages, § 568, 569, 570; 25 C.J.S. Damages, § 198-200.
71 22 Am. Jur. 2d Damages, § 569; L. Meurkens, “The punitive damages debate in Continental Europe: food 
for thought”, in The Power of Punitive Damages – Is Europe Missing Out?, op. cit., p. 10.
72 Restatement of Torts, § 908.
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“wicked” and “reckless”.73 Mere negligence can never form the basis for a 
punitive damages award.74
In the field of intellectual property law, some States make punitive damages 
available to the right holder. In trademark infringement cases in Alaska, for 
instance, the court may enter judgment for punitive damages in an amount 
not exceeding three times the profits and damages.75 The law of Minnesota 
provides that the court, in its discretion, may enter judgment for an amount 
not to exceed three times the profits and damages and reasonable attorneys’ 
fees of the prevailing party if the court finds the other party committed the 
wrongful acts with knowledge or in bad faith or otherwise as according to 
the circumstances of the case.76
In the context of patent law, Section 284 of the U.S. Patent Act provides, in its 
relevant part: “[...] the court may increase the damages up to three times the 
amount found or assessed”.77 U.S. District Judge Leonard Davis of the Eastern 
District of Texas, for example, awarded USD 200  million in compensatory 
damages and USD 40 million in punitive damages, based on Microsoft’s wilful 
infringement of a patent owned by i4i Limited Partnership.78
Section 2. Legal framework for enforcement in the EU
If the enforcement of an American judgment containing punitive damages is 
requested in the EU, the Brussels Ibis Regulation does not apply because that 
instrument only deals with intra-EU judgments. There is no treaty between the 
European Union and the United States arranging for the mutual recognition 
and enforcement of judgments. Individual Member States equally have not 
concluded bilateral or multilateral conventions with the United States. The 
recognition and enforcement of U.S. decisions in the examined EU Member 
States is, therefore, governed by the respective countries’ national rules of 
private international law.
The decision whether to grant enforcement to American awards of punitive 
damages or to refuse it boils down to the question whether exequatur of the 
award would be compatible with the public policy of the requested forum. All 
cases regarding the enforcement of US punitive damages in the EU Member 
States have been decided under this ground of refusal but with different out-
comes.
It is once again underlined that international cases trigger the more narrow 
concept of international public policy. This is the appropriate yardstick when 
73 22 Am. Jur. 2d Damages, §  558; A.J.  Sebok, “Punitive Damages in the United States”, op.  cit., p.  181; 
K. Browne, Punitive damages in the U.S.: a primer for insurance buyers and brokers, Armonk, Swiss Re, 
2011, p. 4.
74 25 C.J.S.  Damages, §  205; L.L.  Schlueter, Punitive Damages – Volume  I, Newark, LexisNexis 2005, 
p. 162.
75 Alaska Stat. 45.50.180.(b).
76 M.S.A. § 333.29.
77 35 U.S.C. § 284.
78 Final judgment available at patentlyo.com/20090811i4ijudgment.pdf.
Punitive damages in intellectual property law – a private international law outlook 215
l a r c i e r
dealing with cases which are not purely domestic. In cases with a cross-border 
element a legal system is supposed to be more tolerant and cannot impose its 
rules of domestic public policy on the matter.79
Section 3. Likelihood of enforcement in the EU
Case law dealing with the enforcement of U.S. punitive damages in the European 
Union is sparse. Italy, Germany, France and Spain are particularly interesting 
because the Supreme Courts of those countries have decided on the issue of the 
enforceability of American punitive damages. A comparative analysis reveals 
that the case law in these selected countries is relatively divergent as to the 
stance adopted towards foreign punitive damages, resulting in different degrees 
of acceptance of this legal remedy.80
§ 1. Positive signals from Spain and France
The judgment of the Spanish Supreme Court (Tribunal Supremo) in Miller 
Import Corp. v. Alabastres Alfredo, S.L. of 13  November 2001 catches the 
eye because the American decision concerned intellectual property law.81 The 
U.S. court awarded treble damages for trademark violations. Treble damages are 
a form of punitive damages arrived at by trebling the compensatory award.82 
The punitive portion of the award will thus amount to twice the compensatory 
damages. At the time, the civil division of the Spanish Supreme Court had 
exclusive jurisdiction over a request for enforcement of judgments coming from 
abroad.83 Litigation between the plaintiffs Miller Import Corp. (domiciled in the 
U.S.) and Florence S.R.L. (domiciled in Italy) and defendant Alabastres Alfredo, 
S.L. (domiciled in Spain) arose before the Federal District Court for the South-
ern District of Texas (Houston Hall) in Houston. The plaintiffs alleged that the 
Spanish defendant had infringed intellectual property rights by manufacturing 
falsified labels of a registered trademark in Spain. In a judgment of 21 August 
1998, the American court followed the plaintiffs’ arguments and granted them 
treble damages.84 Before the Tribunal Supremo the defendant argued, among 
other things, that enforcement should be refused on public policy grounds.
After noting that punitive damages are not acknowledged in Spanish law, the 
Supreme Court first emphasised that its intent was not to usurp legislative 
79 B. Janke and F.-X. Licari, “Enforcing Punitive Damage Awards in France after Fountaine Pajot”, op. cit., 
p. 792.
80 For a more extensive analysis than the one provided in this contribution, see C. Vanleenhove, Punitive 
Damages in Private International Law: Lessons for the European Union, Cambridge/Antwerp/Portland, 
Intersentia, 2016, p. 87-146.
81 Span. Supr. Ct, 13 November 2001, Exequatur no. 2039/1999, Aedipr. 2003, p. 914.
82 Supra, part IV.1., ex. of U.S. provisions allowing for such treble damages in trademark law were mentioned.
83 F. Ramos Romeu, “Litigation Under the Shadow of an Exequatur: The Spanish Recognition of U.S. Judg-
ments”, Int’l Lawyer 2004, p.  951; M.  Requejo Isidro, “Punitive Damages – Europe Strikes Back?”, 
presentation delivered at the British Institute of International and Comparative Law, 2 November 2011, 
London, text on file with the author.
84 Federal District Court for the Southern District of Texas (Houston Hall), 21  August 1998, unpubl. and 
archived. The exact amount of the treble damages is unknown as it is not mentioned in the judgment of 
the Spanish Supreme Court.
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competence in the matter but rather to assess the foreign judgment under 
substantive public policy as identified by Spanish courts.85
It remarked that the Texas money award contained some damages that did 
not serve a compensatory objective but were more punitive, sanction-like and 
preventive in nature. The court classified compensation for injuries as part of 
(Spanish) international public policy. However, it added that coercive, sanction-
ing mechanisms are not uncommon in the areas of (Spanish) substantive law, 
specifically contract law, and procedure. According to the Court the presence 
of such punitive mechanisms in private law to compensate the shortcomings 
of criminal law is consistent with the doctrine of minimum intervention in 
penal law. This doctrine is embedded in the Spanish legal system and requires 
the legislature to first counter unwanted conduct by employing less invasive 
remedial intervention, such as civil penalties. Criminal penalties should only 
be used as ultimum remedium.86 Furthermore, it is often difficult to differen-
tiate concepts of compensation. The example of moral damages to which the 
Court refers makes this point clear. Moral damages fulfil a compensatory role 
(the reparation of moral damage) as well as a sanctioning function and it is 
not easy to distinguish between the two.87 In Spanish law, a minimal overlap 
between civil law (compensation) and criminal law (punishment) is thus not 
completely unknown.88 In making their public policy analysis, the Court finally 
added, courts should not lose sight of the connection between the matter and 
the (Spanish) forum. This is of course a reference to the theory of Inlandsbe-
ziehung, which regulates the strength of the public policy exception according 
to the case’s proximity to the forum.89 All these reasons led the Court to the 
conclusion that punitive damages as a concept do not oppose public policy.90
This finding however did not end the public policy test. The principle of pro-
portionality was the second and final yardstick the award needed to overcome 
before enforcement could be allowed. The Court considered two elements to be 
relevant when assessing the (potentially) excessive nature of the treble damages: 
(1) the predictability of the award and (2) the nature of the interests protected.91
85 S.R. Jablonski, “Translation and comment: enforcing U.S. punitive damages awards in foreign courts – a 
recent case in the Supreme Court of Spain”, 24 J.L. & Comm. 2004-05, p. 229.
86 F. Quarta, “Class Actions, Extra-Compensatory Damages, and Judicial Recognition in Europe”, Conference 
paper – Extraterritoriality and Collective Redress, London, 15 November 2010, Draft 19 November 2010, 
p. 10.
87 C.I.  Nagy, “Recognition and enforcement of US judgments involving punitive damages in continental 
Europe”, op. cit., p. 9.
88 S.R. Jablonski, “Translation and comment: enforcing U.S. punitive damages awards in foreign courts – a 
recent case in the Supreme Court of Spain”, op. cit., p. 229; C.I. Nagy, “Recognition and enforcement of 
US judgments involving punitive damages in continental Europe”, op. cit., p. 9.
89 M. Requejo Isidro, “Punitive Damages: How Do They Look Like When Seen From Abroad?”, op. cit., 
p.  326-327; id., “Punitive Damages From a Private International Law Perspective” in H.  Koziol and 
V. Wilcox (eds.), Punitive Damages: Common Law and Civil Law Perspectives, Vienna, Springer, 2009, 
p. 247.
90 Span. Supr. Ct, 13  November 2001, Exequatur no. 2039/1999, aforesaid, p.  914; M.  Otero Crespo, 
“Punitive Damages Under Spanish Law: A Subtle Recognition?” in The Power of Punitive Damages – Is 
Europe Missing Out?, op. cit., p. 289; M. Requejo Isidro, “Punitive Damages From a Private International 
Law Perspective”, op. cit., p. 247-248; id., “Punitive Damages: How Do They Look Like When Seen From 
Abroad?”, op. cit., p. 326.
91 M. Requejo Isidro, “Punitive Damages: How Do They Look Like When Seen From Abroad?”, op. cit., 
p. 327-328.
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The Court first referred to the fact that the treble damages arose ex lege. The 
legal provisions sanctioning infringements of the intellectual property rights at 
hand took the intentional character and the gravity of the defendant’s behaviour 
into account and foresaw a tripling of the amount of compensatory damages. 
This reliance on the statutory origin of the punitive damages begs the ques-
tion whether punitive damages developed by case law would be predictable 
enough for the Spanish Supreme Court.92 In our opinion, the absence of a 
written provision would not automatically rule out the enforcement of the 
judgment.93 One wonders what would happen to punitive awards coming from 
States where punitive damages legislation does not provide for caps.94 In those 
States the only restraint on the amount of punitive damages comes from the 
American courts, most notably from the U.S. Supreme Court’s case law regard-
ing due process. The Spanish Supreme Court confirmed that the U.S courts 
are prudent in policing the proportionality of damages awarded.95 Moreover, 
legality leads to foreseeability but it does not guarantee proportionality. The 
legislature’s intervention to fix the amount of the punitive damages (whether 
by establishing a maximum, a minimum or an appropriate range) does not 
make the award proportional in all cases. Furthermore, the foreign country’s 
idea of proportionality may vary from the Spanish legislature’s estimation.96
As to the second aspect of the proportionality criterion the Court argued that 
in a market economy the safeguarding of intellectual property rights is impor-
tant. Moreover, this interest in offering protection to such rights is not strictly 
local but is shared universally by countries that harbour similar judicial, social 
and economic values.97 The common desire to protect the interests at stake 
justified the awarding of an amount of twice the compensatory damages on top 
of the compensation granted.98 Consequently, the Tribunal Supremo allowed 
the enforcement of the American treble damages judgment.
The progressive attitude of the Spanish Supreme Court is shared by its French 
counterpart (Cour de cassation). Although the case arose outside of the area of 
intellectual property law, the Court’s reasoning can also be applied to punitive 
damages for intellectual property infringements. In Schlenka & Langhorne v. 
Fountaine Pajot it ruled: “[…] le principe d’une condamnation à des dommages-
intérêts punitifs, n’est pas, en soi, contraire à l’ordre public, il en est autrement 
lorsque le montant alloué est disproportionné au regard du préjudice subi et 
des manquements aux obligations contractuelles du débiteur […]” (“[...] the 
principle of awarding punitive damages is not, in itself, contrary to public 
policy; this is not the case when the amount awarded is disproportional to the 
92 Ibid., 328.
93 Id., “Punitive Damages – Europe Strikes Back?”, op. cit.
94 Ibid.
95 Span. Supr. Ct 13 November 2001, Exequatur no. 2039/1999, aforesaid, p. 914; S.R. Jablonski, “Translation 
and comment: enforcing U.S. punitive damages awards in foreign courts – a recent case in the Supreme 
Court of Spain”, op. cit., p. 229.
96 M. Requejo Isidro, “Punitive Damages – Europe Strikes Back?”, op. cit.
97 Span. Supr. Ct 13 November 2001, Exequatur no. 2039/1999, aforesaid, p. 914.
98 S.R. Jablonski, “Translation and comment: enforcing U.S. punitive damages awards in foreign courts – a 
recent case in the Supreme Court of Spain”, op. cit., p. 230.
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loss suffered and to the contractual breach of the debtor [...]”) (own transl.).99 
According to the French Supreme Court, punitive damages are in themselves 
not contrary to (international) public policy. This position is reminiscent of the 
Spanish Supreme Court’s receptive attitude in Miller v. Alabastres. American 
punitive damages can, therefore, in principle be enforced in France. The ruling 
makes it clear that objections against the enforcement of punitive damages 
based on the argument that they violate the divide between criminal and private 
law should be dismissed.100
This liberal, welcoming position of France’s Supreme Court is very tolerant but 
does not mean that the openness to punitive damages is unbridled. The French 
Supreme Court attached a crucial caveat to the general rule. Punitive damages 
do violate international public policy when their amount is “disproportional 
to the damage suffered and the breach of the contractual obligations of the 
debtor” (own transl.). In other words: although the concept of punitive damages 
conforms to international public policy, the proportionality of the award is still 
a rule of international public policy.101 The centre of the public policy analysis 
shifts from the incompatibility of the concept of punitive damages itself to an 
investigation of their amount.102 The real obstacle for punitive damages under 
the (international) public policy test is no longer the compensation dogma but 
rather the distinct issue of excessiveness. This corresponds to the attitude of 
the Spanish Supreme Court in Miller Import Corp. v. Alabastres Alfredo, S.L.
The Supreme Court’s ruling in Schlenka & Langhorne v. Fountaine Pajot did 
not contain concrete guidelines on how to determine whether a foreign punitive 
award is excessive. It merely provided that punitive damages should not be dis-
proportionate in relation to the injury suffered and the breach of the contractual 
obligations of the debtor. One possible reading of the judgment suggests that the 
French Supreme Court required a comparison between the amount of punitive 
damages and the amount of compensatory damages awarded (or in the words 
of the Court: the injury suffered).103 The Cour de cassation concluded in that 
regard that the punitive damages largely exceeded the compensatory damages 
(the difference between both being USD 70.000).104 This could be interpreted as 
establishing a 1:1 maximum ratio between punitive and compensatory damages.105
99 Cass. Fr. (1st Civ.) 1 December 2010, Schlenzka & Langhorne v. Fountaine Pajot S.A, no. 09-13303, Rec.D. 
2011, p. 423.
100 F.-X.  Licari, “La compatibilité de principe des punitive damages avec l’ordre public international: une 
décision en trompe-l’œil de la Cour de cassation?”, Rec.D., 10 February 2011, p. 425.
101 A.S.  Sibon, “Enforcing Punitive Damages Awards in France: Facing Proportionality within International 
Public Policy”, no page numbers, available at ssrn.com/abstract=2382817.
102 B. Janke and F.-X. Licari, “Enforcing Punitive Damage Awards in France after Fountaine Pajot”, op. cit., 
p. 794-795.
103 For a second interpretation, see C. Vanleenhove, Punitive Damages in Private International Law: Lessons 
for the European Union, op. cit., p. 134-135, nos 308-309.
104 Cass. Fr. (1st civ.) 1 December 2010, Schlenzka & Langhorne v. Fountaine Pajot S.A, aforesaid, p.  423; 
N. Meyer Fabre, “Recognition and Enforcement of U.S.  Judgments in France – Recent Developments”, 
The International Dispute Resolution News spring 2012, p. 9.
105 S.  Lootgieter, “Punitive damages and French courts”, originally retrieved from lacba.org/Files/Main 
Folder/Sections/International Law/Files/120313-PUNITIVE DAMAGES AND FRENCH COURTS.pdf, p. 3; 
N. Meyer Fabre, “Enforcement Of U.S. Punitive Damages Award in France: First Ruling Of The French 
Court Of Cassation” in X. v. Fountaine Pajot, December 1, 2010”, Mealey’s International Arbitration 
Report, January 2011, p. 4.
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Although the punitive damages did not survive the Supreme Court’s scrutiny, the 
decision in Schlenka & Langhorne v. Fountaine Pajot is good news for holders 
of intellectual property rights in the U.S.  The 1:1 maximum ratio between 
punitive and compensatory damages means that compensatory damages for 
infringement can be doubled by American judges, without risk of unenforce-
ability in France. Provisions such as Section  284 of the Patent Act or state 
provisions such as the ones in Alaska or Minnesota (see supra, Chapter  IV, 
Section 1) allow multiplication up to three times the amount of compensatory 
damages. Treble damages will not be accepted in France (in contrast to Spain) 
but double damages should not pose issues as far as enforcement is concerned.
§ 2. Aversion and hostility in Italy and Germany
It is, however, not all roses for right holders wishing to enforce American 
punitive damages judgments in the EU. The Supreme Courts of Italy and 
Germany have traditionally exhibited an attitude of distrust and antipathy 
towards punitive damages. Like Schlenka & Langhorne v. Fountaine Pajot, 
the cases are situated outside the realm of intellectual property rights but the 
decisions of the Courts, nevertheless, have implications for punitive damages 
against intellectual property infringers as well.
The judgments of the Supreme Courts of Italy and Germany represent the 
traditional European disapproving position toward U.S. punitive damages. 
They rejected punitive damages because they argued that the concept itself 
violates international public policy. In 2007, in Glebosky v. Fimez, the Italian 
Corte di Cassazione refused to accept that Italian private law holds any puni-
tive considerations. It found that penalty clauses and moral damages are not 
comparable to punitive damages.106 Five years later, it reiterated this position 
by stating that the Italian civil liability rules only pursue compensatory, and 
not punitive, aims.107 However, a very recent ruling of 5  July 2017 seems to 
represent a Copernican revolution in Italy.108 Punitive damages are no longer 
held to be contrary to Italian public policy. Instead, the (potential) excessive 
nature of the punitive damages award is the only yardstick to be employed. 
With the judgment Italy switches to the Spanish and French corner.
Already in 1992, in the case of John Doe v. Eckhard Schmitz, the Bundes-
gerichtshof ruled that U.S. punitive damages awards cannot be enforced in 
the German territory. The German Supreme Court referred to various argu-
ments underlying this decision. It underlined the compensatory function of 
German private law and noted that enrichment of the plaintiff is prohibited. 
The Supreme Court further held that punishment and deterrence are objec-
tives that belong to the criminal law sphere. Punitive damages interfere with 
106 Cass. It. (civ.) 19  January 2007, no. 1183, Rep Foro it 2007 v Delibazione, no. 13, and v Danni Civili, 
no. 316; Corr. Giur. 2007, no. 4, p. 497, transl. F. Quarta, “Recognition and Enforcement of U.S. Punitive 
Damages Awards in Continental Europe: The Italian Supreme Court’s Veto”, 31 Hastings Int’l & Comp. 
L.Rev. 2008, Appendix A, p. 780-782.
107 Cass. It.(civ.) 8 February 2012, Soc Ruffinatti v Oyola-Rosado, no. 1781/2012, Danno resp 2012, p. 609.
108 Cass. It., 5 July 2017, Axo Sport S.P.A. v. Nosa Inc., no. 16601/2017.
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the State’s monopoly on penalisation because a private person acts as public 
prosecutor. The defendant cannot rely on the fundamental guarantees that 
are available to him in criminal law proceedings. The Bundesgerichtshof also 
rejected the parallel between penalty clauses and punitive damages.109
Chapter VI. Conclusion
This contribution used the ruling of the European Court of Justice in OTK v. 
SFP as cause to discuss the enforcement of punitive damages judgments in the 
EU. The European Court of Justice held that Article  13 of the Enforcement 
Directive does not preclude national legislation, under which the holder of an 
intellectual property right that has been infringed may demand from the person 
who has infringed that right either compensation for the damage that he has 
suffered, taking account of all the appropriate aspects of the particular case, or, 
without him having to prove the actual loss, payment of a sum corresponding 
to twice the appropriate fee which would have been due if permission had 
been given for the work concerned to be used. The impact of the judgment 
on Belgian court decisions awarding more than the actual damage is such that 
these decisions should no longer be frowned upon because the European Court 
of Justice has now given its seal of approval to extra-compensatory damages 
at the national level. The amount granted should in any case not exceed the 
loss suffered so clearly and substantially as to create an abuse of rights.
As Member States’ courts can award punitive damages for violations of intellec-
tual property rights, the enforceability of judgments containing this contentious 
remedy needs to be addressed. Within the EU the refusal of such judgments 
seems highly undesirable given the strong language of the Brussels Ibis Regu-
lation (requiring that enforcement be manifestly contrary to public policy) and 
the principle of mutual trust between EU Member States.
For judgments coming from third States, the situation is quite different. It became 
clear that every country has construed the (international) public policy exception 
differently. Germany has rejected punitive damages because the concept itself 
violates (international) public policy. As things stand, the likelihood of recovering 
US punitive damages is, therefore, virtually nil. France and Spain on the other 
hand have accepted the compatibility with (international) public policy. The 
latter countries have instead focused on an investigation of the amount granted 
by the foreign Court. In France the Cour de cassation seems to have limited 
its tolerance of punitive damages to an amount equal to the compensatory 
damages awarded. In Spain the level of acceptance is higher as treble damages 
were given the green light by the Tribunal Supremo. The Italian Supreme Court 
traditionally adopted the same approach of rejection as its German counterpart 
but has very recently joined the Spanish and French position.
109 BGH 4 June 1992, BGHZ, no. 118, p. 312; NJW 1992, p. 3096; RIW 1993, p. 132; ZIP 1992, p. 1256 
(English transl. of the relevant parts of the judgment by G.  Wegen and J.  Sherer, “Germany: Federal 
Court of Justice decision concerning the recognition and enforcement of U.S. judgments awarding punitive 
damages”, 32 I.L.M. 1329 [1993]).
Punitive damages in intellectual property law – a private international law outlook 221
l a r c i e r
What these judgments mean for other countries, such as Belgium, is uncertain. 
It remains to be seen how new courts will respond when faced with punitive 
damages in enforcement proceedings. First, it is doubtful whether they will 
accept the institution of punitive damages. Second, assuming they embrace 
the concept in se, it is very difficult to predict at which point foreign punitive 
damages will be deemed intolerable in light of (international) public policy 
considerations.
Samenvatting
In OTK v. SFP besliste het Hof van Justitie dat artikel 13 van richtlijn 2004/48 
zich niet verzet tegen een nationale regeling waardoor de houder van een intel-
lectueel eigendomsrecht, van de inbreukmaker hetzij vergoeding van de door 
hem geleden schade kan verlangen rekening gehouden met alle passende aspec-
ten van het concrete geval, hetzij – zonder dat hij de feitelijke schade hoeft aan 
te tonen – betaling kan vorderen van een bedrag van tweemaal de passende 
vergoeding die verschuldigd zou zijn geweest indien toestemming was verleend 
om het betrokken werk te gebruiken. Deze bijdrage bespreekt dit recente arrest 
van het Europees Hof van Justitie in de zaak OTK v. SFP en haar effect op de 
implementatie van artikel 13 van richtlijn 2004/48.
De bijdrage analyseert vervolgens of buitenlandse gerechtelijke beslissingen die 
punitive damages bevatten ten uitvoer gelegd kunnen worden in België, enerzijds 
wanneer zij uit een ander EU-land komen en anderzijds wanneer zij van buiten 
de EU komen.
Résumé
La Cour de justice, dans l’affaire OTK v. SFP, a décidé que l’article 13 de la direc-
tive 2004/48 ne s’oppose pas à une réglementation nationale, selon laquelle le 
titulaire d’un droit de propriété intellectuelle lésé peut demander soit la réparation 
du dommage qu’il a subi, en tenant compte de tous les aspects appropriés du cas 
d’espèce, soit, sans que ce titulaire doive démontrer le préjudice effectif, le paie-
ment d’une somme correspondant au double de la rémunération appropriée qui 
aurait été due au titre d’une autorisation d’utilisation de l’œuvre concernée. Cette 
contribution analyse l’arrêt récent de la Cour de justice de l’Union européenne 
ainsi que son effet sur la mise en oeuvre de l’article 13 de la directive 2004/48.
La contribution analyse ensuite si des décisions judiciaires étrangères contenant 
des dommages et intérêts punitifs peuvent être exécutées en Belgique, soit venant 
d’un autre état membre soit venant de l’extérieur de l’Union européenne.
